On December 2, 1999 legislative powers were formally devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Executive committee.

I think we all accepted that the journey to stability and political normalcy hadn't been completed at that point, but most of us did believe that we were at the start of a very important process, from which good government, proper accountability and productive inter-party, inter-community relationships would flow.

That's what I hoped for when I was appointed Minister of Enterprise. I wasn't naive enough to believe that the problems that had dogged Northern Ireland for decades were going to disappear overnight; and nor did I imagine that unionists and republicans would have a frost-free relationship.

I vividly remember my first encounter with the Civil Service after becoming a minister. They were polite and efficient, but weren't quite sure how to react after a career of dealing with non-resident direct rulers.

That I was an active local politician was a challenge for them as most of their experience was with ministers who didn't practice politics here. I am not sure that the Civil Service has fully got its head round this yet!

While I see my work as seamless, whether it is work on behalf of the department or representational work, there is a natural reluctance by civil servants to have any connection with politics.

But back to the main issue. There were many people, across all of the unionist parties, who weren't prepared to take Sinn Fein on trust.

The leadership of the UUP was aware of that fact when, on November 27, 1999, we asked the Ulster Unionist Council to endorse the kick-starting of the Executive committee.

That said, it was always our view that having Sinn Fein in a Northern Ireland settlement would eventually lead to their compliance with accepted democratic standards. This meant getting rid of weapons and the methods of control that flowed from their possession.

This is why the talks at Winfield House (the residence of the US Ambassador to London), which immediately preceded devolution, concentrated on decommissioning. It was failure to honour the commitments given during these talks that led to the first suspension of the Assembly early in 2000.

The Agreement was never perfect. We knew that from the outset. And that's why a formal review was built in, allowing us to alter the mechanics after the Assembly had bedded down for a couple of years. But we never really got to that point.

Yes, there were side deals and add-ons, but most of that was to do with meeting the needs of individual parties rather than improving government itself.

Those who believed that a workable deal would only fully emerge if the so-called 'extremes' took control of the political and electoral agenda have been proved wrong.

Instead of producing a better deal at St Andrews, the DUP and Sinn Fein opted for an 'us-and-them' strategy that has resulted in a relationship in which mutual hostility is tempered by mutual veto.

Consequently, on a whole array of issues - review of public administration, education, policing and justice and a shared future, to name just the headline ones - we have stalemate and self-serving solo runs rather than consensus and collective responsibility.

Relative peace has prevailed since the agreement was implemented, and that, for my party and the community, has been our greatest success.

However, we have a long way to go to restore confidence that local politicians really can deliver what the people need.

Now we are once again entering a period of political turmoil with the Executive not functioning properly. My party will continue to strive to make Stormont work in the interests of the people.

That, for the UUP at least, remains the primary function of the Agreement. And I believe that that's what people voted for in 1998.