The gulf between Coveney and unionists: how it grew and why it's unlikely to change

The right now was a reference to Brexit and to the DUP's confidence and supply arrangement with the Conservative government, negotiations for which began five days before Coveney's appointment.

The relationship between Irish Ministers of Foreign Affairs and unionism had tended to be reasonably good post-1998, primarily because there was a clear sense of having the same end goals in mind when it came to the Good Friday Agreement (even though the DUP never fully endorsed it) and a functioning Assembly.

Unionists weren't overly bothered about any unity threats from the Irish and maintained a very civil, although sometimes quite discreet, relationship with the key players.

Crucially, successive Irish governments also maintained dialogue with loyalist paramilitarism, doing what they could to understand its concerns, as well as offering help with the process of transformation to entirely peaceful and democratic structures. Indeed, a number of loyalists told me they had a better relationship with Irish governments and ministers than with the NIO.

But the Brexit result upended the dynamics, particularly for the Irish side, which suddenly and unexpectedly found itself siding with the EU against the UK.

It also found itself coming under enormous pressure from nationalism in Northern Ireland, which looked to the Irish government to protect rights and a multiplicity of political/constitutional identities which it believed were dependent on membership of the EU. And, of course, Brexit also raised huge problems about the location of a new UK/RoI border and the impact it would have on both the Good Friday Agreement and North-South relationships.

This was the problem which Coveney inherited in June 2017. Worse, there were no precedents he could look to for possible solutions, because this was something entirely new.

It didn't help that the DUP - still smarting from the loss of a unionist majority in the March 2017 Assembly election - had opted for a new form of uber-unionism with the ERG wing of the Conservative party and more or less opted out of dialogue with anyone else.

That's why I noted my concerns in the May 2018 piece for the Belfast Telegraph. At a moment when unionism, and not just the DUP, needed to be improving the dialogue and relationship with the Irish government and with Coveney in particular, they seemed to be drifting further and further apart.

The assessment of loyalism was particularly damning. This is what Jim Wilson, a former member of the Red Hand Commando and now in the Loyalist Communities Council, told me in an interview in November 2019: "Bertie Ahern worked tirelessly with us and put the hand of friendship out to many of us in the loyalist community. Indeed, we got to the point where we almost trusted him more than our own government representatives. But under Leo Varadkar and Simon Coveney things have changed. When we have met them - three times now - we may as well have talked to the wall. They didn't heed what we said. They could have helped loyalism and unionism over May's backstop and given us a breathing space, a bit of time if you like: but they didn't bother. They had no interest in helping us. They slapped us in the face and undermined 20 years of hard work."

All of unionism now shares the same view of Coveney. Arlene Foster accused him of "ignoring unionist concerns and hoping they'll just go away." Steve Aiken said he had shown, "gravity-defying levels of arrogance and hypocrisy." Jim Allister complained he was "trashing east-west relationships ... with barely disguised triumphalism and bombastic belligerence." And the Orange Order has given its support to a united unionist response to dump the protocol.

So the chances of a rapprochement between unionism and Coveney seem remote.

But to be honest, this is what happens when former partners - the UK and the Republic in this case - are forced to choose a side. Each will prioritise and protect its own interests.

Coveney is not just negotiating on behalf of the Irish government, either. He needs EU approval, which limits his room for manoeuvre.

Unionism, meanwhile, is just as cross with Johnson as it is with Coveney, but can't risk a complete falling out with the PM at this point.

I'm not sure there's anyone from the Irish side - even Bertie Ahern - who could easily repair the relationship with unionists.

This is, ultimately, a battle between the EU and the UK and I'm not persuaded either of them cares all that much for Ulster unionism.

An opportunity for unionism and the Irish government to work better together was missed during 2017-19. Both sides are to blame, albeit for different reasons.